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In the last fortnight events in the economic struggle have happened with a rapidity seldom seen in Britain. Events in the economic struggle must be responded to by the classes in society. The conduct of each class will reflect itself in the balance of class forces after the event; it determines what is gained or lost. This conduct is determined by the class's real interests in the event (i.e. what is at stake for them); their political consciousness (how they see the event); and what forces they are capable of bringing to bear on the event.
The events and an analysis of them are below:
THE RAIL DISPUTE
The railway wages dispute has been settled. The Government had exposed itself in the Miners' strike by pitting its own exhortations about inflationary wage settlements being anti-social and flaunting the national interest against the miners.
The nation responded with (l) the working class as a class entering the strike on the miners side with a will to support the miners for as long as they would stay out; (2) the bourgeoisie decided in the face of the working class' determination that the miners were indeed a special case and deserved more money for their thankless toil. The Government was left high and dry with the support of neither class. The rail wages dispute appeared quickly after the miners strike. Attempts to elicit public outrage at the dislocation due to the work to rule were not particularly successful. The British 'public' was unmoved and took no political action against a well organised section of the working class. (Opinion polls for years have shown that a majority of the 'public' favours getting tough with unions. However this sentiment remains part of the culture of individualism - it has no political expression because petty bourgeois politics has long ago disappeared in Britain in its own form. To lead political action openly against the Unions would be impossible in Britain, because the 'public', i.e. the working class, in politics is conscious of the need to defend trade unions against the bourgeoisie.) Thus exposed again, the Government used first the cooling off period and second the compulsory ballot provisions of the Industrial Relations Act against the railwaymen. Both were invoked without much forethought; the Government clearly felt constrained to be seen to be acting in the situation - not to have abdicated responsibility to the naked anarchy of confrontation which the British ruling class has learned to avoid if possible. In addition there was a definite opinion growing in both classes that if the Industrial Relations Act was not used by the Government it would never be used.
The Government could not act as all previous Governments since the war have done and use conciliation (which is well known to produce concession from the bourgeoisie). The capitalist class cannot afford this form of settlement now. Nor could they act as did the Baldwin Government of 1926 and simply permit the confrontation to take place. Such confrontations end either in concession or coercion from the ruling class. Coercion by physical force or even political coercion cannot be used indefinitely or even for very long over the working class. The working class is numerically a majority and politically too conscious of its democratic rights under British parliamentary democracy. Indeed, coercion must be the option of last resort. Because once used and defeated (i.e. the balance of forces being redressed in favour of the working class and normality restored) by the physical and political strength of the working class, it would cease to be a credible deterrent.
The Government therefore went to the law, which is 'above us all', whose rule guides all classes and is meted out impartially. The trouble was that even though the Government said they were using the Act because it was law and therefore intended to be used, their move was seen by both classes for what it was - an attempt to awe the rail workers by the fear of the law. The same Ministers who protested that they had taken the dispute to Court as disinterested administrators had also committed themselves publicly against the railwaymen: Anthony Barber: "while we must all hope that commonsense will prevail, if it does not and if the industrial action takes place, it is right that the public should know that the Government stands ready to take whatever action is necessary to protect the nation and we shall not flinch from our duty. We have learnt the lessons of the past." (FT, 12.6.72). The railwaymen were not awed and indeed settled for little less than they had in fact asked for at first. The end result - the Government again lost face. Not because the law was disobeyed - it was observed to the letter. But because their intentions - which the 'nation' saw as their intention - was that the law should bring the rail unions to heel by breaking their will to stay out for a better offer.
What has been the ruling class' assessment of this event? First, the Government remains adamant that all it ever intended was to operate the law and that after all other recent wage settlements had been more sober and responsible. That of the class is best summed up in David Watt's (FT political correspondent) judgement: "Things only started to go wrong when ... the affair started to turn into a political crusade. As a matter of fact, there might have been a case for this if it had been done much earlier in the dispute; for whatever one thinks of the arguments employed, every Government is entitled to get as much public support as it can in such a situation. But by appearing to join a great constitutional struggle at the last minute over three weeks pay, the Government has confused its followers and weakened its own persuasive powers. It began what is very hard to carry through, and, as it now seems to have realised, we shall never be able to repair matters this way." (FT, 9.6.72)
Because the Government felt compelled to defend its use of the Industrial Relations Act in constitutional terms, it gave the actual event more political significance than it merited. No industrial dispute is ever a struggle between 'the rule of law and the forces of anarchy' unless the political consciousness of one class or the other views it in this way. It was clear that the working class certainly did not view it as such. Had they done so there would have been an unstoppable pressure on the TUC to support the railway unions in refusing to appear before the Industrial Relations Court. (It was just such pressure that forced the TUC to call the General Strike in 1926.) And it was also clear that the ruling class was not united in insisting that the Government should invoke the Industrial Relations Act either. Once the Government action had been taken, it was supported by the class; but it was by no means convinced that the risk of constitutional crisis was worth it. It was much more far-sighted than the Government seemed in recognising that the real problem for the class lay not in who would win the rail dispute or whether the Industrial Relations Act should be used in this instance. It was the problem of how to bring about a lowering of the real wages of the working class and to intensify the rate of exploitation by winning back shop floor power from the working class. Neither the Industrial Relations Act or the rail dispute represented decisive points in working out this problem. That is because the ruling class has been very careful not to define exactly its objective: it is out for what it can get from the working class and to plainly state it would inevitably involve a defensive reaction from the working class: a trial of strength. The Government came dangerously close to defining that objective as the rail unions giving in and taking 12.5% instead of l4%; while the rail workers voted 6-1 for 14% and the working class showed no signs of turning against them. The Government pulled in its horns in the nick of time and Vic Feather used his good offices to bring about what the FT blandly described as a "face-saving'' solution which gave 14% so that it didn't look like 14%.
After 1926 the ruling class learned that constitutional crises do not alter the fundamental balance of economic forces. The ruling class won the General Strike politically but was still left facing its economic problems, and a working class which, though defeated in that event politically, had not unlearned the need for class solidarity and self-defense. It had not gone forward, but it had not moved backward. In the present situation the bourgeoisie badly need the help of the trade union leaders in making the necessary changes in the relations of production. But the trade union leaders will be no help (no matter how much they subjectively will to sell out) if the Industrial Relations Act or the Government forces the TU leaders to separate themselves from their members for the sake of the law or national interests or become outlaws leading a working class united in opposition against the Government. Either outcome would render the trade union leaders useless from the point of view of edging their members along towards modernisation and 'wages in the national interest'. Once the support of the rank and file is removed from the trade union leader, he stands for nothing. Unlike an MP whose authority is only tested once every election (or in political crises which are rare occurrences indeed in Britain) a trade union leader's authority is tested every time his members take industrial action: if he counsels moderation and is ignored, he either moves with them or de facto abdicates. Therefore, the ruling class is concerned not to provoke the rank and file and force the TU leaders into moving one way or the other. As long as the working class is not engaged in open struggle, the TU leaders can manoeuvre credibly and in fact move the class with them (e.g. TUC moves re Incomes Policy with the Labour Government from 1964-66). Thus the ruling class were indeed relieved to see the l4% given; because the alternative would have funked the overall problem: "My own feeling in any case is that such a climactic showdown - a major strike broken by troops, or a mass defiance of the National Industrial Relations Court, or a General Election called on the 'who governs Britain' issue - is unlikely to come about. Most of the leaders on both sides realise that this kind of 'simple' solution, far from clearing the air, might divide the nation more deeply than at any time since, perhaps, 1688, and that whoever won it might take generations to clear up the mess. If it happens in future it will be due partly to the folly and shortsightedness of the union leaders, but partly, one has to admit, it will be because the Conservatives have started to believe all their own propaganda." (D. Watt, FT, 9.6.72)